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CASE NOTES
predicated, as in the instant case, on the fact that the finance company is
better able to bear the risk than is the innocent purchaser, the courts
thereby ignoring or discarding both precedent and statutory language which
require a contrary result. Some cases show clearly that the finance com-
pany, in its dealing with the seller, had actual knowledge of the fraudulent
scheme." In such an event the UCC unequivocally excludes it from holder-
in-due-course status since the subjective test for good faith is not satisfied.
But short of a finding of actual knowledge and in the absence of a governing
statute, courts should require only a showing of subjective good faith36
 and
refrain from decisions, such as that in the instant case, which open the way
for a return to the "suspicious circumstances" test of Gill v. Cubitt."
FORREST W. BARNES
Negotiable Instruments—Stop Payment Order on a Certified Check—
Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code.—Winston v. Kasper Am. State
Bank.'—This action was brought to recover the amount of a certified check.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, was the payee of a check dated August 31,
1956, drawn on and certified by defendant bank before delivery. Instead
of cashing the check, the plaintiff instituted an action against the drawer
for the full amount of the commission which he believed to be due him. Sub-
sequently, in May 1957, when the drawer learned that the plaintiff was not a
licensed real estate broker as required by a Chicago ordinance, he stopped
payment on the check and caused an indemnity bond to be posted. The
drawer was not a party to the present action but a petition to intervene was
filed by the assignee of one-half of the drawer's interest in the security
deposit held by the casualty company. On June 30, 1960 the plaintiff
that defendant finance company was not a holder in due course. The author of the note
disagreed with the decision even under an "objective test" for good faith.
35 See G.M.A.C. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So. 2d 319 (1954), noted in 53 Yale L.J.
877 (1955)
36
 See note, 33 N.C.L. Rev. 608, 613 (1955), where the following comment appears:
If, in fact, there is present a situation so fraught with the possibility of
fraud or unfairness that the statutory provisions of the NIL are not adequate,
then it seems that legislation is the only sound solution. Nothing but uncertainty
can arise out of an encroachment upon these statutory provisions by judicial
decisions. Undoubtedly this situation presents a ripe' opportunity for collusion
between unscrupulous finance companies and dealers to take advantage of the
buyer. Clearly in some cases the finance company has actually participated in
the transaction to such an extent that it cannot be a holder in due course within
the statutory provisions. But in other cases there is no evidence of such direct
participation in the transaction by the finance company as would charge it with
`actual notice' or bad faith as required by the NIL. In the absence of additional
legislation, it is submitted that innocent finance companies that come within the
definition of holder in due course under the existing statutes, should not be
deprived of that position because of a tendency of the courts to 'catalogue' them
in the same class with unscrupulous companies by the indiscriminate or deliberate
use of such terms as 'close connection.'
37 Supra note 17.
1
 184 N.E.2d 725 (III. App. 1962), appeal denied by Sup. Ct. of Ill., Nov. 28, 1962.
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endorsed the check and presented it to defendant for payment which was
refused. Plaintiff's basic contention was that payment on a certified check
may never be stopped. HELD: The drawer of a check which has been
certified at his request before a conditional delivery has the right to require
the certifying bank to refuse payment as against a payee who is not a holder
in due course; and a contract entered into as a real estate broker without
a license is void and unenforceable, and thus furnishes a complete defense
to this action.
The right of a drawer to stop payment on a check arose as a corollary
to the contract of deposit and has been preserved by the NIL and UCC 2
as a necessary service to depositors. Although the underlying obligation is
temporarily suspended by the issuance of a check given in satisfaction
thereof, the drawer is not discharged, and upon dishonor for any reason, the
holder has recourse not against the drawee bank with whom he has no privity,
but against the drawer both on the instrument and on the underlying obliga-
tion.2
Certification, on the other hand, if procured by the holder or payee con-
stitutes a novation and the drawer is thereby discharged.' In Times Square
Auto. Co. v. Rutherford 5 a stop payment order was honored, but in the action
by the payee the court refused the certifying bank the benefit of the drawer's
defense of fraud. Similarly, in Jones v. Nat'l Bank 6 the drawer's defense
that the check, subsequently certified at the holder's request, was given for
an illegal consideration was not available to the bank as a defense to its
contract of acceptance. In effect, the court reasoned that the holder had
requested the bank to retain his money for him until he asked for it and the
bank so agreed. If a certifying bank for any reason such as insolvency was
unable to make good its obligation, the loss would fall entirely on the holder.
Since the effect of certification procured by the holder approaches the legal
equivalent of payment, and the holder is content with the obligation of
another rather than cash, both results are logical. 7 The protection afforded the
holder of a check thus certified is complete.
However, where the drawer procures certification, courts have treated
the resulting rights and liabilities differently, as in the instant case. Such
certification has been found not to release the drawer from liability but
2 UCC § 4-403. NIL § 189 provided that a check was not of itself an assignment of
funds. The courts justified the right to stop payment on the ground that a check was a
mere order and could therefore be revoked at any time prior to payment. Second
Nat'l ,Bank v. Meek Appliance Co., 244 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1951) ; Speroff v. First-Cent.
Trust" Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948) ; Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376
Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954). Before the NIL all checks in some jurisdictions operated
as pro tanto assignments of funds, terminating the drawer's control thereof and the stop
payment order was not allowed. First Nat'l Bank v. Keith, 183 III. 475, 56 N.E. 179
(1899) ; Loan & Say. Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 74 S.C. 210, 54 S.E. 364 (1906).
8 NIL § 61, UCC §§ 3-413 & 3-802(1) (b).
4 NIL § 188, UCC § 3-411.
6 77 N.J.L. 649, 73 Mi. 479 (1909).
8 95 N.J.L. 376, 113 Atl. 702 (1921).
7 Blake v. Hamilton Dime Say. Bank Co., 79 Ohio St. 189, 87 N.E. 73 (1908).
Certification operates as a pro tanto assignment and the drawer loses control over the
funds represented by the check.
460
CASE NOTES
merely to superimpose on his liability as drawer that of the certifying
bank.s The resulting liability is primary on the part of the acceptor and
secondary on the part of the drawer. Consequently, on failure of the ac-
ceptor to perform, the holder may still look to the drawer for satisfaction .°
The general recognition of the resulting liabilities is best illustrated by the
widespread existence of statutes requiring bids on public construction to be
accompanied by checks certified before delivery. 1°
In Sutter v. Security Trust Co." the distinction made according to who
procured the certification was applied to stop payment orders. There, the
drawer of a check had it certified and delivered to the payee. After discovering
what he alleged to be fraud, the drawer stopped payment. The drawee
demanded indemnification which the drawer declined to furnish, and the
check was paid over the stop payment order to one purporting to be a holder
in due course. The drawer sued the certifying bank for the amount of the
check charged to his account. The court held as controlling the distinction
between checks certified at the request of the payee or holder and those
certified by the drawer. In the latter situation it was held that the drawer of
the check could issue a stop payment order and require the certifying bank
to refuse payment to the payee if such payee was not a bona fide holder
for value but had obtained the instrument by perpetrating a fraud upon the
maker. The court determined that should such payee bring suit against the
certifying bank upon its refusal to pay, the bank could have the benefit of
any of the drawer's defenses which establish that the instrument was obtained
by fraud, duress or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration. The
court ruled in favor of defendant bank because it would have been obligated
to pay the payee since plaintiff failed to show that she had obtained the
check by fraud.
On the issue of permitting payment to be stopped on a check certified
at the request of the drawer, Sutter and Winston are in agreement. Thus,
in the jurisdictions where the distinction is made according to who procured
certification, should a bank which has certified at the drawer's request pay
over a stop payment order, it •does so at its risk for it may still be liable
to its depositor if the latter's defense is eventually deemed adequate by the'
courts. If it defends against the payee, the allowance of interpleader, 12
impleader or availability of the jus tertii could be a matter of speculation.
It is possible to conclude from the language of the Sutter case that the
jus tertii privilege is narrowly confined to those situations where the more
serious business transgressions have been committed. But confusion as to
8
 Florida Power & Light Co., v. Tomasello, 103 Fla, 1076, 139 So. 140 (1932) ;
Welch v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 264 App. Div. 906, 35 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1942). The result
is a corollary to NIL § 188.
Borne v. First Nat'l Bank, 123 Ind. 78, 24 N.E. 173 (1890). However, the drawer is
discharged to the amount of the loss suffered as a result of the holder's failure to present
the certified check for payment in due course. Heartt v. Rhodes, 66 III. 351 (1872). See
UCC H 3-601(1)(i) & 3-502(1) (b).
to Note, The Law of Certification of Checks, 78 Banking L.J. 376, 378 (1961).
11 96 N.J. Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924).
12 The contract of certification may negate the neutral status of the stake holder
as between the parties required by strict rules of interpleader. Kimball Trust & Say.
Bank v. Olsen, 239 Ill. App. 609 (1926).
461
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the scope of the rule abounds. For example, in McAdoo v. Farmers State
Bank13
 the drawer stopped payment on a check originally certified at his
request. The payee sued the certifying bank upon its refusal to pay and
joined the drawer as a party defendant. The court refused to allow the
certifying bank the benefit of the drawer's defense of lack of consideration
even though the plaintiff was not a holder in due course." However, a New
York courtly allowed the certifying bank to interplead the drawer and
intimated that his defense of breach of contract would be available to the
bank if it was established. The court further pointed out that it was only
where certification was procured by the payee or holder that a bank may not
resist the enforcement of its contract of acceptance.
The Sutter decision led to legislation in New Jersey and New York
abolishing the right to stop payment on a certified check regardless of who
procured the certification. 16
 The UCC, now in effect in Illinois, also
abolishes this right," and except in cases of theft categorically prohibits the
obligor from setting up the jus tertii unless the third party himself defends
the action.i 8
 It should be noted that the elimination of the jus tertii privilege
under the Code is not intended to abrogate local rules of intervenor, inter-
pleader, impleader, etc. should the certifying bank choose to refuse payment
and stand suit, provided that such rules are consistent with the objective
of relieving the disinterested obligor bank of the duty of litigating the claim. 19
The element of indemnity, not present in the Sutter case, poses an in-
teresting problem within the context of the UCC. Assuming the facts of the
Winston case in a Code jurisdiction, would indemnification, as treated in
section 3-603,20
 terminate or modify the bank's right with respect to the
item granted by section 4-303? 2' Section 3-603, dealing with adverse
13
 106 Kan. 662, 189 Pac. 155 (1920).
14
 The court did not emphasize the fact that the drawer procured certification and
this may indicate that the Kansas courts do not recognize the Sutter distinction. The
distinction seems to have been operative in Indiana, Nardine v. Kraft Cheese Co., 114
Ind. App. 399, 52 N.E.2d 634 (1944); and Missouri, Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, 199
Mo. App. 583, 205 S.W. 875 (1914). But cf. Kellog v. Citizens Bank, 176 Mo. App. 288,
162 S.W. 643 (1915). The distinction appears not to have been operative in Arkansas,
Merchants & Planters Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Ark. 1, 170 S.W. 852 (1914);
Florida, Florida Light & Power Co. v. Tomasello, 103 Fla. 1076, 139 So. 140 (1932).
15 Welch v. Bank of Manhattan, supra note S.
16
 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17: 9A-225(a) (1925); N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 325-a
(1944). But see Fiss Corp. v. National Safety Bank & Trust Co., 191 Misc. 397, 77
N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
17
 The elimination is two pronged:. UCC §§ 4-403 & 4-303.
18 UCC §§ 3-306 & 3-603 & comments thereto.
19 Ibid. See also UCC §§ 3-803 & 4-407.
20 Section 3-603. Payment or Satisfaction, (1) The liability of any party is
discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though
it is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument unless
prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim either supplies
indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins
payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties. This subsection
does not, however, result in the discharge of the liability. . . .
• 21 Section 4-303. When Items Subject to Notice, Stop-Order, Legal Process or
Setoff; Order in Which Items May Be Charged or Certified. (1) Any knowledge,
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claims, discharges the liability of a party to the extent of his payment not-
withstanding knowledge of the claim of another person to the instrument
unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the claimant posts indemnity or
enjoins payment or satisfaction in an action in which the adverse claimant
and the holder are parties. Comment 3 thereto explains that the contract of
an obligor is to make payment to the holder, and except in cases of theft or
restrictive endorsement, there is no good reason to put him to inconvenience
because of a dispute between two other parties unless he is indemnified or
served with appropriate legal process.
Usually the word "pay" and its derivatives used with respect to an
item in the Code denote not payment in cash but some action taken by the
payor bank the effect of which is to substitute its own liability in place of
the drawer. Section 4-303 directs itself toward designating the winner of a
race between the holder of an item and creditors of the drawer or the drawer
himself for the amount of the item. All of the instances, legal process, stop
payment order, etc., note by this section come too late to nullify any prior
act of the payor bank constituting final payment including certification. 22
Unquestionably the term "legal process" is not intended to include
"injunction" otherwise, the opportunity provided by section 3-603 would be
substantially impaired. Thus an injunction would be effective to preclude
the bank from performing its obligation notwithstanding prior certification
of the item. There seems to be no reason under the Code why the effect of
posting adequate indemnity (the counter-part of an injunction in section
3-603) should not be equally effective. Consequently, the Winston case would
fall within the purview of section 3-603 which would require the bank to
stand suit, whereas the Sutter case would be controlled by section 4-303 which
would permit the drawee to pay over the stop order without remorse.
The Code's approach eliminates prior difficulties by clearly defining the
positions occupied by the drawer and drawee. Whether the drawee's refusal
to honor a certified check is mandatory by virtue of indemnity or voluntary in
its absence, the drawer must defend the action. 23
 If the drawer refuses, his
defenses (except for theft) will not be available to the drawee and the court
will decide in favor of the holder? }
 The decision will bind the drawer and
preclude his having recourse against the drawee.25
 Thus the Code treats the
drawer as an adverse claimant once an injunction is obtained or indemnity
is posted. The outcome is made to depend upon the drawer's initiative, if not
upon who procured certification. It is apparent, therefore, that under the UCC
notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or setoff exercised by
a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law to terminate,
suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its
customer's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or
modify such right or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process
is received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires
or the setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item; .. .
22 UCC § 4-213(1).
23 UCC §§
24 UCC §§
25 UCC §§
3-306,
3-411
3-803
3-803 &
& 3-413.
& 4-303.
3-603.
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certified checks have been removed from the embrace of the problems in-
herent in stop payments orders, and henceforth will be governed by the law
of adverse claims.
TIMOTHY DALY
Securities—Issuance of "Put" and "Call" Options—Applicability of
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.—Silverman
v. Landa.1—Plaintiff shareholder, relying on sections 16(b) and 16(c) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, commenced this action on behalf
of his corporation,2
 against Alfons Landa, a director of the Fruehauf
Trailer Company, to recover alleged insider short-swing profits. Landa had
simultaneously issued a put and a call option on Freuhauf common stock.
The call option was given for a premium, and entitled the optionee to buy
from Landa, at any time within the following year, 500 shares at a prede-
termined price. The put, similarly issued for a retained premium, provided
the bearer with the option of selling to Landa, at any time within the follow-
ing year, 500 shares at the same predetermined price. The call options were
allowed to lapse, whereas the put was subsequently exercised. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. HELD: The matched sale of put and call
options did not, in and of themselves, constitute a "purchase and sale" of
the underlying security within the purview of section 16(b), and there
having been no sale, section 16(c) could not have been violated.
Section 16(b) requires an "insider" 3
 to account to his corporation for
any trading profits made by him in any six month period from the purchase
and sale or sale and purchase of the issuer's stock or similar security. {
"Purchase" is elsewhere defined as including any "contract to buy, purchase
or otherwise acquire,"3 and "sale," as including any "contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of,"° the corporation's securities. Section 16(c), in essence,
prohibits "selling short" or, if the trader in fact owns the security, his
failure to deliver it within twenty days of the sale.'
The court, faced with the novel question of the applicability of these
statutory provisions to the issuance of a "straddle"s (i.e., the simultaneous
1 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
2
 The Securities and Exchange Act provides for a corporate cause of action, and
if said corporation fails to take advantage of it or prosecute it diligently within a given
period, any security owner can sue to recover on behalf of the corporation any profits
made by the trader. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). See Lattin, The
Law of Corporations 277 (1959); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
and Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 408 (1953).
3
 The statute specifically refers to any director, officer, or beneficial owner of more
than 10% of any class of equity security registered on a national securities exchange.
4
 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
5
 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1958).
6
 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1958).
7 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1958).
8 The context within which this decision was reached was clearly stated by the
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